

number of "elevated" teachers. If under Soviet conditions, institutions are managed by non-specialists, then why could not elementary school teachers without an adequate knowledge be "elevated" into the post of lecturer at secondary schools? It has been proved that such "elevation" is practiced in Soviet schools. Therefore, it is not an accident that the knowledge of secondary school students is far from corresponding with the program of instruction and that there also are many who have to repeat a year. In the Klichev secondary school, for example, every fourth student "fails". (Zviazda May 23rd, this year). From these examples it is obvious that the majority of Soviet school teachers lack extensive, systematic study in the acquisition of pedagogical and, to a considerable degree, general knowledge. 875

The Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogy of the Ministry of Education of the BSSR is called upon to study progressive methods of instructive and educative work, to give directives to the oblast' institutes in the task of improving the teachers. [647] •

"Those few works which deal with the teaching experience which have been prepared and published by the Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogy, are of an informative character they are not profound in their content, and they lack scientific basis." (Zviazda August 4th, this year).

The oblast' institutes of improvement do not enjoy authority among the teachers. The function of these institutes is to analyze and generalize the best examples of the pedagogical work of teachers and then to introduce them in the schools.

"The people working at the Polotskiy Institute generally do not have a serious attitude towards their obligations. Teachers from the town and the oblast' do not feel that the Institute is improving teachers to the point of active leadership, or that it is actually helping them in their work", - this is how Ozernikov, a teacher from the town of Polotsk, characterizes the work of the Institute. (Zviazda, July 1st, 1953).

The immediate direction of school affairs is carried out by the rayon sections of national education through the appropriate inspectorship. The school inspector is the official state controller of the methods of school instruction, but he is also expected to help teachers with questions of instruction and education. But "in the apparatus of particular rayon sections of national education, and 871 875

701 students at the Minsk officers school were also recruited exclusively
543 from among Belorussians, /15/ and all the training as well as the
commands were given in Belorussian. A special corps of specialists
on Belorussia, with the experienced philologist, Baranovskii, as
their leader, was selected for work in the officers' school. All the
military regulations of the Red Army were translated into Belorussian.
But the Belorussianization of these two divisions was sharply curtailed
after 1930, the Belorussian specialists were fired from the officers
school, and a significant number of them were subsequently arrested
together with their leader. By 1932 no traces remained of the Belo-
russianization of these two territorial divisions. The Second Division,
quartered in Minsk, had its name changed from Territorial to Ex-
perienced Regular Division, and the Belorussianization of parts of
the Red Army was pronounced a harmful diversionary activity.

543 At one point, in order to strengthen the Soviet state, the
647 slogan of "going to the soil" was promoted in Belorussia. The main
reason for this was to fill the Soviet state apparatus with local workers
independent of their nationality, and by this it was intended that the
local Party workers, being native inhabitants of the area and knowing
the language, customs, and way of life of the Belorussians, would
be the more close to the national masses. However this campaign
did not have any widespread success and was swallowed up by ensuing
campaigns which were of a broader nature.

Propaganda among the Peasants

665 In 1924, a movement began in Belorussia under the noisy
title of "Let's face the land," and it involved the mass dispatch of
responsible workers from the centers into the rayon and village
soviets for agitation and organizational work there. When the NEP
had attained a steady tempo the peasantry found itself in a very
665 (134) difficult situation. The prices of agricultural products were low and
those of factory made products immeasurably high. For example, a
peasant had to pay no less than 320 kilograms of grain for an ordinary
Tula samovar. At the time the hard and reliable Soviet chervonets
had acquired a solid position in the economy. But the peasants had no
665 557 chervontsi . . . To raise the depressed mood of the peasantry propa-
gandists were sent out for extended periods, and some of them were
even left in the rayons for permanent work as responsible Party leaders.
It was decided simultaneously to advance non-Party peasants and
factory workers to responsible positions. Such a new worker was

557 called a 'vydvizhenets' /promoted worker/. Generally such workers
 665 were appointed as deputies of various kinds; independent work was not given to them /16/ because of their non-Party status and the fear of distortions in the Party line . . . To tell the truth they often had to sail with the wind, orient themselves according to Party workers, and compromise with their convictions, especially in settling peasant problems. The leaders of the Belorussian national movement made use of this well-advertised and all-embracing campaign to send out their best propagandists for further work in planting the Soviet state apparatus "in the soil" and especially to select vydvizhenets workers /for their own ends/. It would be possible to mention many successful vydvizhenets, as examples. For instance in the Slutskiy Okrug, the peasant vydvizhenets Fedorovich enjoyed unquestionable authority, occupying the post of deputy president of the okrug executive committee. The peasant vydvizhenets Dubovtsev made such a favorable impression with his work that as a result he even became Deputy President of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet. He possessed the necessary qualifications in administrative work, was modest both in his personal life and on the job, and a promoter of the national work. Part of the vydvizhenets group returned to their former jobs in the kolkhozes and factories, and a very insignificant portion entered the Party.

647 The official organs which had the job of guiding the national work were the so-called National Commissions in the center and the district centers. The staff of a National Committee was composed of representatives of the separate nationalities. However they had no practical or organizational significance. The work was carried on outside their auspices and without their guidance. It was almost a dead superstructure of which there were and are many in the Soviet system.

Belorussians in Poland

661 Everything done by the nationalists in the B. S. S. R. had a colossal
 563 influence upon the Belorussians, especially upon the youth and intelligentsia, living in western Belorussia, which was under Polish rule. There they had no right even having been deprived of the right to acquire property. Without renouncing its nationality the intelligentsia could not find work. The Belorussian primary and high schools were closed, although they were
 1/ [To raise the morale of the peasants caught in an unfavorable economic situation. Cf. p. 19, Cat. 116--Analyst]

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731 This natural catastrophe, in addition to all the other burdens of post-war recovery, has necessitated even greater efforts by the farmers to overcome handicaps and to boost production as high as their hardest labours will allow.

474 The Soviet Government has, since the drought,¹ taken additional steps to eliminate difficulties and to strengthen the collective farm management. On September 19, 1946, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. issued a decree calling for the elimination of abuses of the collective farm charter. A Collective Farm Council was created, the main tasks of which are to establish "strict control over the observation of collective farm statutes"; to guard the collective farm property against embezzlement or misuse; and to ensure greater participation in the farm management by the workers themselves.

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Under the new regulations of September 1946, all lands illegally taken from the collectives are being restored. Sovetskaya Byelorussia reported: "More than 81,000 hectares of land... have been returned to the collective farms (in Byelorussia)." Unauthorized personnel are being taken off the payrolls; administrative staff is being reduced; and the collective farmers are taking greater part in the administration of the kolkhozes. General meetings are called regularly, and management and auditing committees elected by the membership are responsible for reporting back to the membership. "The democratic procedure of convening general meetings for discussion of and decision on vitally important questions... is now being returned."¹

Planned Increases in Agricultural Production

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433 According to the Five Year Plan, 1946-50, the crop area of the B.S.S.R. in 1950 is to reach 5.3 million hectares, including 3.2 million hectares under grain, 344,000 hectares under industrial crops, 1.06 million under potatoes, vegetables, and fruit, and 690,000 hectares under fodder crops.

Average yields of all crops are expected to be as follows: grain, 1.03 metric tons per hectare; potatoes, 14.5 tons per hectare; and flax, 0.3 tons per hectare. These are somewhat lower than the yields fixed for the Soviet Union as a whole because of the relatively poor quality of the soil in Byelorussia: for example, in the B.S.S.R. in 1950 the average yield of grain is to be 1.2 metric tons per hectare, while that of flax is put at 0.4 tons per hectare.

According to the Moscow periodical, Slavyane (1946, II-III, pp. 32-35), the B.S.S.R.'s total production of grain in 1950 will represent an increase of 10 per cent. over 1940. On this basis, the 1940 grain harvest must have been between 2.7 and 3 million tons. In the U.S.S.R. the 1940

¹ Sovetskaya Byelorussia, Minsk, December 20, 1946.

± [in 1946--Analyst]